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Modelling national scale events: What lessons can we learn from the Covid-19 pandemic? 
 
Hugh Boyes, WMG CSC, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK. CV4 7AL 
 
Abstract 
This paper reviews the handling in the United Kingdom of the Covid-19 pandemic.  It 
examines the daily official statistics that feature in news bulletins and considers how these 
relate to the spread of the virus in hospitals, care homes and the community.  It considers 
the reporting of figures from computational models and how the aggregated statistics 
potentially present a misleading picture to the public about deaths, testing and infections. It 
identifies a number of significant weaknesses in the handling of information during the 
event and the need for improvement in information management and governance. A 
number of recommendations are presented for improvements in the handling of national 
scale high impact events. 
 
Introduction 
The spread of Covid-19 has presented serious challenges for national and regional 
governments when seeking to implement appropriate and proportionate policies to manage 
the spread and its impact. The approaches adopted have varied significantly between 
nations which raises the question of what the best strategy is to manage such incidents. In 
press briefings given by ministers and officials in the UK and elsewhere it has been said that 
the policies are based on following the science.  
 
The UK Government apparently considers that the “science” of this epidemic is reflected in 
mathematical modelling undertaken by a team at Imperial College, London, whose forecast 
of 500,000 deaths is said to have prompted the adoption of a lockdown policy. At the same 
time the Swedish government based on scientific advice has pursued a public information 
and social responsibility approach, aiming to avoid the impact that lockdown has on 
individuals and the economy. These are two very different interpretations of epidemiology 
and the science behind the spread of Covid-19. 
 
This paper is based on analysis of publicly available information [1, 2, 3] and explores the 
handling of the pandemic in the UK from a systems thinking perspective [4] and the 
application of a basic control systems approach to the problem. It then reviews what is 
known about the modelling undertaken by the Imperial College team. The paper then 
examines how the official statistics released on a daily basis relate to a simple ecosystem 
model of the country and spread of the virus in different environments. It discusses how 
changes to the management regime could improve our response to the spread of Covid-19. 
 
Applying control systems theory 
There is some ambiguity about when the spread of Covid-19 started. The narrative adopted 
by national governments is that the spread started in Wuhan and is associated with the 
Huanan seafood wholesale market [5]. However, a recent report from France [6] following 
retesting of a sample taken on 27th December 2019 suggests it may have been spreading for 
longer. This assertion is supported by an article in the South China Morning Post [7] and 
research findings that a number of strains exist [8] with varying symptoms and severity [9].  
 
From a control perspective during the initial spread, the UK, USA and Europe comprised an 
open loop system as illustrated in Figure 1. Borders remained open and there was little or 
no quarantine or testing of travellers entering a western country. There was no effective 
restraint on the import of the virus by infected and infectious travellers. Detection of Covid-
19 infections was through limited public health surveillance activities, medical practitioners 
identifying infected patients based on published symptoms and for hospital patients the 
laboratory testing and investigation of samples. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Open loop system, no controls 
As the level of infection and deaths increased in Wuhan, the Chinese authorities imposed 
strict control measures, including travel restrictions, track and trace of those potentially 
infected and lockdown of a number of cities [10]. Citizens in western nations became more 
aware of the potential spread as the media coverage increased [11]. Despite a worsening 
situation in China and evidence of international spread, the largely unrestricted global flow 
of travellers continued. On 22nd January 2020, Public Health England announced “enhanced 
monitoring” for all direct flights from Wuhan would be deployed, requiring arrivals to be 
checked for Covid-19 symptoms [12]. Airlines responded by suspending flights from 
mainland Chinese cities [13]. In addition to the above limited travel-related measures the 
UK government publishing hygiene advice on handwashing to limit virus spread, guidance 
for primary care [14] and on environmental cleaning following a possible case [15]. 
Effectively the open loop control continued (Figure 2) with infected travellers seeding the 
spread in the UK. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Open loop system, public hygiene advice 
On 31st January 2020 [16] there were the first reporting of two confirmed Covid-19 
infections in the UK. The Chief Medical Officer for England is reported as saying: “We are 
using tried and tested infection control procedures to prevent further spread of the virus. The 
NHS is extremely well-prepared and used to managing infections and we are already 
working rapidly to identify any contacts the patients had, to prevent further spread.” [17] 
The control metric was the number of infections, presumably based on patients presenting 
themselves for treatment by the health service and testing positive for Covid-19. 
 
It is unknown at the end of January how many UK residents had been exposed to the virus, 
but the number of infections started to increase. Eight cases were identified by 10th 
February [18] and two medical practices closed in Brighton [19] one for cleaning and the 
other due to infection of medical staff. One of infected Brighton residents was diagnosed as 
contracting the virus in Singapore and was later linked to 11 other cases, five of which were 
in the UK [20]. Quarantine was employed as a control measure for 83 people repatriated 
from Wuhan, who were released when negative test results confirmed they were virus free 
[21]. 
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The first UK Covid-19 related death was reported on 5th March [22], followed by a second on 
7Th March [23]. The focus of the control metric appears to have shifted to deaths rather 
than infections. Both the deceased had apparently not recently travelled outside of the UK, 
indicating a spread of the virus in the community. The control approach moved to an 
embryonic close loop approach (Figure 3) where attempts were made to track and trace 
contacts, with testing to confirm whether they were infected. The Prime Minister's official 
spokesman stated that it was "highly likely the virus is going to spread in a significant way" 
[24]. Given the evidence from Asia of the infectious nature of the virus, this is indicative of 
an apparent lack of knowledge about the existing virus spread in the UK. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Initial “closed loop” model 
On 16th March the UK control model shifted towards isolation and social distancing as the 
control measures (Figure 4) with announcements that people should avoid all non-essential 
contact [25]. Then on 20th March, closure of all bars, pubs, cafes and restaurants [26] and 
the subsequent closure of schools [27] was announced. On 23rd March the Prime Minister 
announced that a lockdown would commence the following day; this unprecedented move 
was supported by emergency legislation [28].  
 
 
Figure 4 - Modified "closed loop" model 
Although Figures 3 & 4 are referred to as closed loop, they are ‘leaky’ models, i.e. not all 
infections are detected and/or reported, so there are questions about how effective and 
timely the feedback was. 
 
Computer/Computational modelling and its role in the event 
The event has been accompanied by headlines reporting the projected number of deaths 
likely to occur from the spread of Covid-19. For example, The Sunday Times reported: “It 
was team Ferguson’s research paper of March 16 that prompted the lockdown, warning that 
without it more than 500,000 people could die. It also projected that a full lockdown of the 
kind now in force could reduce that to less than 20,000” [29].  From a medical perspective, 
computer modelling and simulation refers to: “the process of constructing and manipulating 
computer-based mathematical, graphical or algorithmic representations of real life systems 
or phenomena, for the purpose of conducting computer-based simulations to study, predict 
or optimise the behaviour of the system(s) / phenomena under consideration” [30]. The 
model itself may be regarded as an abstract representation of the system(s) or phenomena, 
that has been created for a specific purpose. It is however only a projection or opinion 
based on assumptions about the virus, its spread and the impact on infected individuals. 
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When designing a computational model, the developer typically works through a series of 
steps:  
“Step 1. Identify the problem. 
  Step 2. Formulate the problem. 
  Step 3. Collect and process real system data. 
  Step 4. Formulate and develop a model. 
  Step 5. Validate the model. 
  Step 6. Document model for future use.” [31] 
Although this suggests that model development is a single series of steps, in practice it 
should be iterative, with the underlying hypothesis and assumptions tested against 
collected data and validation employed to assure the model as well as assess deviations 
between predicted and observed outcomes.  
  
As part of the model definition, the developer will make a series of assumptions about how 
the system(s) or phenomena perform. These key design decisions may be reflected in 
specific aspects of the model software, e.g. the algorithms used, or as parameters that may 
varied during simulation experiments. The model documentation should provide: “the 
developer's description of what the model or simulation will represent, the assumptions 
limiting those representations, and other capabilities needed to satisfy the user's 
requirements” [32]. Whilst “Step 5” refers only to validation, best practice is the verification 
and validation, the former answering the question "Have we built the model right?" the 
latter answering the question "Have we built the right model?” [33]. 
 
The need for rigour in the design and assurance of computer models is recognised by the UK 
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS). In its guidance on quality 
assurance for models [34] it sets out a development and assurance process “to ensure that 
policy decisions are underpinned by a sound understanding of all relevant evidence, 
including associated risks and uncertainties”. In another official report on modelling 
produced by the UK Government Office for Science, it recommended that: “Decision-makers 
need to be intelligent customers for models, and those that supply models should provide 
appropriate guidance to model users to support proper use and interpretation. This includes 
providing suitable model documentation detailing model purpose, assumptions, sensitivities, 
and limitations, and evidence of appropriate quality assurance.” [35]  
 
Where computational modelling is used in engineering and scientific applications those that 
have been verified and validated can deliver results very close to practical measurements of 
the phenomena. This is achievable where the nature of the phenomena, be they physical, 
electrical, chemical, radiological, etc., are well understood and the models have been 
though a number of iterations to fine tune algorithms and parameters. This is not the case 
with Covid-19, which until a few months ago was an unknown agent and about which there 
are a number of uncertainties [36]. 
 
Given the BEIS guidance, where a model is to be used to influence UK policy and shape 
handling of the response to a national event, it would be reasonable to expect that the 
software: was developed using trustworthy software principles [37]: has been documented; 
was subject to verification and validation; and is available for review and/or audit by 
experts. This appears not to be true in this case as the model apparently “consists of several 
thousand lines of dense computer code, with no description of which bits of code do what”. 
In agreeing with this statement its developer, Professor Neil Ferguson, stated in an 
interview: “For me the code is not a mess, but it’s all in my head, completely undocumented. 
Nobody would be able to use it . . . and I don’t have the bandwidth to support individual 
users” [38]. On Twitter, he posted the following: ”I’m conscious that lots of people would 
like to see and run the pandemic simulation code we are using to model control measures 
against COVID-19. To explain the background - I wrote the code (thousands of lines of 
undocumented C) 13+ years ago to model flu pandemics...” [39].  
 
Subsequently, when a refactored version of the code was made available online [40]. 
Typically refactoring is intended to improve readability, reuse and structure, without 
affecting the meaning or behaviour. It was revealed that the original code comprised a 
single file of 15,000 lines of code [41]. A review [42] of the repository and some of the issues 
being raised about the refactored code highlights software design and quality issues. For 
example, testing of this software by a team from Edinburgh University identified a bug [43], 
which yielded a variation of approximately 80,000 deaths over an 80-day period. This was 
dismissed as a known issue by one of the Imperial College team.  
 
These short comings in the development and assurance of the model might be set aside if 
the modelling team had a history of producing reliable predictions. As highlighted in the 
press [44] and illustrated in Table 1 with supporting references, the track record of such 
modelling is poor with excessive gaps between the predictions and the actual deaths. 
 
Year Disease Predicted deaths Actual deaths 
2005 Bird Flu (H5N1)  [45] 200,000,000 (Global) 374  [46] 
2009 Swine Flu (H1N1)  [47] 65,000 (UK) 457 [48] 
2000 vCJD  [49] 136,000 (UK) 178 [50] 2002 BSE  [51] 50,000 (UK) 
Table 1 – Epidemic/Pandemic Predictions 
Understanding the Official Statistics 
UK public authorities are publishing a number of data sets relating to the deaths in the UK, 
Covid-19 related or not, infections, testing, and hospital bed occupancy. The relationship 
between the data sets is ambiguous as there are issues regarding the definitions employed 
for individual sets, the quality measure supporting their capture and the timeliness of 
reporting. A number of these issues are illustrated below.   
 
NHS Reporting 
NHS England release daily data on the Covid-19 daily deaths [1], which relates to: “deaths of 
patients who have died in hospitals in England and had tested positive for COVID-19 or 
where COVID-19 was mentioned on the death certificate. All deaths are recorded against the 
date of death rather than the date the deaths were announced.” The figures reported are a 
composite of deaths “from the latest reporting period, 5pm 2 days prior to publication until 
5pm the day before publication.” This leads to a potentially confusing situation where the 
press is reporting the number of deaths “today” but the figure for deaths that actually occur 
on the reporting date will not be known for some time. This disparity is increased by the fact 
that the NHS England report only applies to deaths in hospital and excludes those in care 
homes or the community.  
 
Examining the daily deaths in hospital data published by NHS England [52], the data as at 7th 
May reveals that in English hospitals the peak number of Covid-19 deaths was 874 on 8th 
April, which as shown in Table 2 is the aggregated deaths reported by NHS England over a 
28 day period. On 9th April, the first day on which deaths the preceding day were reported, a 
total of 765 new deaths were reported, but of these only 140 occurred on 8th April. The 
differences between the number reported on a day and the latest outturn for that day are 
illustrated in Figure 6. This chart shows how the declining number of deaths in English 
hospitals is not reflected by the aggregate new deaths figures in the daily release. In 
practice the figures are potentially misleading if not appropriately interpreted, for example, 
in the period 21st – 25th April, media reporting could swing between extremes. 
 
Note: The data supporting Figures 5, 6 and 7 and listed in Table 2 were derived from the 
whole of England total on the COVID19 daily deaths by region tab of the Covid-19 daily 
announced deaths spreadsheets published by NHS England [1]. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Daily deaths data - subject to further revision due to reporting lag  
 
Date Reported Deaths reported Reporting Lag 
09/04/2020 140 1 
10/04/2020 356 2 
11/04/2020 161 3 
12/04/2020 52 4 
13/04/2020 28 5 
14/04/2020 13 6 
15/04/2020 21 7 
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NHS England - Covid-19 Deaths in Hospital
Daily Cumulative 7-day Rolling Av.
16/04/2020 11 8 
17/04/2020 10 9 
18/04/2020 7 10 
19/04/2020 2 11 
20/04/2020 2 12 
21/04/2020 12 13 
22/04/2020 13 14 
23/04/2020 3 15 
24/04/2020 10 16 
25/04/2020 14 17 
26/04/2020 2 18 
29/04/2020 2 21 
30/04/2020 4 22 
02/05/2020 1 24 
03/05/2020 3 25 
05/05/2020 4 27 
06/05/2020 3 28 
Total 874  
Table 2 – Breakdown of deaths on 8th April by date reported, as disclosed at 6th May 
 
Figure 6 - Reporting comparison 
The reporting lag has a significant effect on the totals reported. The number of “in hospital” 
deaths reported on a specific day is typically within 90% of the total outturn figure on the 
eighth day after the death occurred. As illustrated in Figure 7 there is a long tail on this 
reporting lag, with deaths being reported up to 54 days after they occurred.  
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Figure 7 - Reporting Lag - date of death to inclusion in daily figures 
Cabinet Office 
The UK Government provides daily press briefings and releases a set of slides and 
supporting data for each briefing. The discussion below takes a snapshot of the data 
presented at the briefing on 6th May. The number of new Covid-19 cases is potentially a key 
factor in the policy regarding lockdown and the stated need to “save lives, protect the NHS”. 
 
 
Figure 8 - UK Government reporting of new Covid-19 cases 
The volume of new cases since 29th April could suggest that the virus spread continues 
unabated, but according to the slides [53] and data [54] released for the press briefing on 
6th May, the number of Covid-19 related patients in UK hospitals has fallen from a peak of 
20,686 on 12th April to 12,481 on 5th May. The data shows that in striving to reach the 
Health Secretary’s target of 100,000 tests per day [55], the increased testing for Covid-19 
has identified more cases of infections, as illustrated in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9 - UK Government data on new cases and testing 
UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
Compared to the NHS England Covid-19 deaths, the ONS publishes statistics for all deaths 
where Covid-19 was mentioned on the death certificate. The data published by ONS on 5th 
May [56] allows comparison of the NHS England data with the provisional total Covid-19 
related deaths in England, this is illustrated in Figure 10. The provisional data shows that for 
deaths registered by 2nd May, 19,033 deaths had occurred in hospital and 28,272 occurred 
in total. Thus, a third of the deaths (9,239) occurred in care homes or the community. There 
are a number of supporting notes regarding the mortality statistics set out on the page from 
which the data set was downloaded [57]. 
 
 
Figure 10 - Comparison of total Covid-19 deaths reported in England with NHS England figures 
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Excess Deaths 
There are concerns that ONS figures may not fully represent the deaths associated with 
Covid-19, For example, an analysis [58] suggests that 11,277 excess deaths occurred in 
England and Wales during the period 21 March–24 April (35 days). The analysts suggest that 
such figures, whilst open to interpretation, may help us to understand the full impact of 
COVID-19 on mortality, including deaths indirectly related to COVID-19, for example those 
arising from delays in seeking medical care for other conditions. Other analysis by medical 
researchers demonstrates the rapid increase in deaths from all causes during April 2020 [59] 
 
Interpreting the relationship between Official Statistics and virus spread 
In viewing the various statistics identified in the preceding section, the complexity of the 
underlying physical ‘system’ is not evident. Figure 11 seeks to put the statistics in context by 
illustrating how individual statistics relate to the physical location of individuals in England. 
This Figure establishes a series of paths that an individual may follow having come into 
contact with the Covid-19 virus. It illustrates the serious information management challenge 
facing those trying to prevent further infection and/or manage those already infected.  
 
 
Figure 11 - Flow chart modelling potential relationships between Official Statistics 
A complicating factor in seeking to control spread is the time interval between an individual 
being exposed to the virus and the emergence of symptoms. It has been stated that in the 
period 2 to 3 days [60] before appearance of first symptoms an individual may be spreading 
the virus to others, with infectiousness declining significantly 8 days after symptom onset. 
The research also indicates that if you cannot trace over 80% of the infected individual’s 
contacts, you will lose control of the spread. If we examine the three dotted lines this 
implies that while asymptomatic: 
a) in a care home setting a staff member or resident may be spreading infection to 
other residents and/or staff; 
b) in a hospital setting, an individual whether a patient or not, may be spreading it to 
other hospital users and staff; 
c) in both the above settings staff may carry the infection into their homes; and 
d) in a domestic setting a family member or other resident may be spreading it to other 
occupants. 
In these scenarios if testing only occurs when individuals report having symptoms then it is 
too late as they may have already infected a number of other people, i.e. pushing the 
reproduction rate (Re) over 1.0 and sustaining the continued growth of community 
infection. The current English lockdown arrangements do not mitigate (a), (b), or (c) above 
as the contacts are not social contacts, they are a product of the medical or social care 
situation, or the individual’s employment. 
 
Another observation is that the various statistics do not identify the degree to which the 
population may have already been exposed to, caught and recovered from the virus without 
seeking medical attention or being tested. A research paper postulated [61] that a 
significant proportion of the population may fall into this category, which would be 
reflected in Figure 11 through the “Not in Covid-19 Statistics” outcome. There is some 
research now underway to explore this category [62, 63] 
 
Information Management and Governance 
As an island nation the UK has a complex management structure for health and social care, 
compounded by the responsibilities for reporting by Whitehall and the devolved 
administrations. The management of an event, like the spread of Covid-19, involves complex 
spatio-temporal information, with a need for an integration data model approach to 
support analysis of data supplied by national and local organisations. The latter is necessary 
to combine contextualised information from three distinct but interdependent 
environments: hospitals, care homes (and similar institutions) and the wider community. In 
reviewing the published data and accompanying notes, it appears that the different 
reporting chains at administration and national level leads to inconsistent infection, death 
and testing data sets. 
 
In considering the data notes for the press conference held on 6th May, in respect of the 
“Daily tests (UK)” data [64], the notes state that: 
a) “For clinical reasons some people are tested more than once. Therefore the number 
of tests completed may be higher than the number of people tested.” 
b) “For serology testing (Pillar 4), some protocols allow for samples to be tested 
repeatedly. Samples are anonymised prior to sending to the lab for testing, therefore 
the identification of individuals tested is not possible in the current reporting process, 
and so the number of people tested is not reported.” 
c) “Daily totals reflect actual counts reported for the previous day. Each day there may 
be corrections to previous reported figures. This means that previously published 
daily counts will not necessarily sum to the latest cumulative figure. It also means 
that today’s cumulative count may not match the previous day’s cumulative count 
plus today’s daily count.” 
d) “The number of tests includes; (i) tests processed through our labs, and (ii) tests sent 
to individuals at home or to satellite testing locations.” 
In view of the statements in (a) and (b) it is impossible from this data to ascertain how many 
individuals have actually been tested and whether an individual who tested negative in 
subsequent tests is found to be infected. This information would helpful to understand the 
efficacy of the testing, i.e. percentage of false negative results and the spread over time 
within health and other key workers. Given the anonymisation referred to in (b) it would 
suggest that the identity of the individuals is unknown, so they are untraceable. The 
statement in (c) means this data is of limited utility in conducting time series analysis, and 
the lack of geographical location for the tests limits our ability to assess whether tests are 
being targeted at areas where there are new outbreaks. The situation envisaged in (d) 
further undermines faith in the figures as a test sent to an individual’s home does not 
represent a completed test until it has been processed. 
 
In the same set of notes, in respect of the “People in hospital with COVID-19 (UK) “ data [65], 
which is sourced from NHS England, Welsh Government, Scottish Government, Northern 
Ireland Executive, the following statements appear:      
a) “Fluctuations in the North West have been driven by data validation changes and 
missing trusts returning data (creating artificial spikes in reporting.)” 
b) “Nine hospitals, including London Nightingale did not return data for April 9, 
resulting in a misrepresented drop in hospitalisations.” 
c) “National data may not be directly comparable as data about COVID-19 patients in 
hospitals is collected differently across nations.” 
d) “Community hospitals are included in figures for Wales from 23 April onwards.” 
e) “Scottish data has been updated to only reflect 'confirmed' cases; with 'suspected' 
cases removed.” 
 
The statements in (a) and (b) represent poor collection and management of these statistics, 
and bring into question the governance arrangements, for example why were there missing 
trusts, what changes have been made to the data validation and how does this affect the 
results? The virus does not respect national or administrative boundaries, so variation in 
data definitions coupled with the notes (d) and (e) raise doubts about the consistency and 
accuracy of the dataset. 
 
From this brief examination of two of the datasets used in the daily press briefings it 
appears that there is a significant information management issue regarding the Covid-19 
statistics. The lack of consistent data definitions and information governance issues 
identified above suggest that the published figures fall short of the standards 
trustworthiness and quality set out in the UK Code of Practice for Statistics [66].   
 
Discussion 
The UK responded to the Covid-19 pandemic with a strategy that was based on an influenza 
virus rather than one designed to respond to a SARS-type virus [67, 68]. The lack of early 
engagement of public and environmental health teams to support tracking and tracing of 
infected individuals and their contacts allowed the virus to establish itself in the community. 
The situation may have been further exacerbated by the assumption, based on a plan to 
respond to an influenza pandemic, that the role of the health service was to hold the fort 
until a vaccine could be deployed – feasible for influenza and less so for Covid-19. 
 
From a systems perspective the current management response to Covid-19 does not appear 
to address the interdependence of the three environments: hospitals, care homes and the 
wider community. Hospital and care home environments by their nature are not closed 
ecosystems, they are leaky due to the movement of people, particularly staff, between the 
environment and the wider community. Whilst good hygiene measures and social distancing 
may help, working in close proximity to infected individuals and the associated viral load 
may have contributed to the death of health workers [69] and presumably creates an 
increased risk of spreading infection back into the community as new clusters. It is 
interesting to note that in a hospital where higher levels of biosecurity were employed there 
have been no health workers infected [70]. Given the advice provided by PHE to primary 
care in January [71] it was apparently recognised at an early stage that the virus was highly 
infectious and additional biosecurity measures were required. Although lockdown can 
reduce the incidence in the community, these locations may act as reservoirs of infection 
that can be spread back into the community. 
 
Figure 12 sets out a more sophisticated control systems approach that addresses the three 
environments. Given the infectious nature of the virus and the lack of a vaccine to slow or 
prevent its spread, there is a need for timely detection and intervention in respect of new 
infections and asymptomatic carriers. The use of routine rapid testing of staff, patients and 
residents could be deployed to detect and respond to new infections in these environments. 
There are a variety of tests available with varying degrees of maturity [72]. We should not 
be looking for 100% accuracy in the testing, as some errors will inevitably occur leading to 
false positives and negatives. The key objective is to be able to make quick, informed 
choices with a view to reducing spread whilst minimising the impact on people’s freedom 
and the economy.  
 
An important criterion in setting up testing and the feedback/reporting process for care 
homes and hospitals is the need for rapid turnaround to ensure timely interventions can be 
made to limit further spread. The reporting process should proactively share information 
with community track/trace/testing teams so that appropriate health surveillance can be 
mobilised to monitor close contacts of those that are newly infected. These reporting and 
intervention processes need to be deployed at a local level to ensure timely action and to 
take advantage of local knowledge when tracking and tracing in the community. Looking at 
the response to Covid-19 of those countries affected by SARS and MERS, for example South 
Korea, based on their previous experience of this type of virus they have rigorously enforced 
this public health activity as a core part of their infection control [73]. 
 
In addition to the above public health measures there is a clear need to improve the 
information management and governance so as to provide reliable consistent information 
for policy makers and health service managers to use. The significant delays in reporting 
Covid-19 deaths and the complexity of the flows in Figure 11 make it difficult to develop a 
coherent picture of the virus’s spread. This is probably compounded by the lack of 
information on how endemic its spread was in the community, although this is now 
belatedly being remedied. 
 
 
Figure 12 - Addressing the system complexity to reduce spread of Covid-19 
Recommendations 
The following recommendations from the analysis of the current published data collections 
related to the UK’s response to the pandemic should be transferred into general 
preparedness and resilience planning. To improve the UK’s response to similar events in 
future, it should: 
1. Develop appropriate information management and governance practices, including 
standard data definitions, an integration data model and assurance process, so as to 
provide, with varying levels of granularity the government, responders and the 
public with a timely and accurate view of the situation;  
2. Use of real time data and case studies of an incident collected from those engaged in 
the front-line response to inform and assist in the design of prevention and 
mitigation measures. 
3. Where computational modelling is employed for scenario planning, institute publicly 
available checking of assumptions, verification of coding practices and the assurance 
and reproducibility of results. 
4. Instigate an assurance process as soon as realistically possible in a crisis event to 
avoid incorrect analysis leading to policy decisions that are not going to achieve the 
goals set down by the public authorities. 
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5. Maintain awareness of the hazards of group thinking within scientific committees 
and advisory groups where these are likely to be influenced by the politics of 
research and the politicians.  
6. In new or evolving situations, the science is rarely settled and is better exposed to 
review and challenge rather than assuming the advisors have the only or optimal 
solution. Conflict of interests can be avoided by creating a range of review and 
assurance mechanisms beyond the stakeholders at the heart of the event. 
7. Application of models to the planning is acceptable, but where these models can be 
supported by results that accord with any other reasonable produced analysis and 
are updated with a feedback loop based on practical observations and analytical 
results during the event lifecycle.   
8. Awareness and caution of applying models used in any discipline such as medical 
models where these have been developed on non-catastrophic events or single case 
outbreaks of a problem.  The alternative which the Chinese used and which was 
applauded by the WHO was that China very early diverted from the WHO epidemic 
plans and established a set of systems based on observations of the event and its 
impact and an understanding of where to institute controls that would reduce 
infectivity and increase survival of victims.   
9. Development of new models for resilience where control systems are designed for 
the systems involved in the event, taking into account capacity, staffing and other 
logistics that may affect the outcome and exercised to identify and remedy 
vulnerabilities in whatever controls or measures are proposed. 
10. To avoid the publication of misleading information, whether in the form of headline-
making predictions of deaths or casualties, or the reporting of metrics from the 
event. 
 
Conclusions 
Observing the UK’s handling of the Covid-19 virus, despite pandemics appearing at the top 
of the national risk register for a number of years the planned response was for a different 
type of virus (influenza) where containment and vaccine development are relatively well 
understood. There are serious lessons from the UK’s errors in using computational models 
that were not assured against epidemic data already available from China and Italy early in 
the New Year. The UK has based unprecedented key decisions on locking down the 
population and affecting the economy on unverified and unvalidated computation, which 
evidence from previous epidemic projections suggest generates publicity rather than 
delivering informed decision-making through good scientific practice. At the same time the 
UK has failed to institute key measures in infection control. The most severe consequences 
of employing non-assured models and failure to implement infection control based on real 
data about Covid-19 is that one of the world’s financial centres, London now faces a 
complex challenge of an embedded virus and little or no gain in its control over a nine week 
shut-down.  
  
The Figures 11 and 12 are generic tools to start to build a pathway out of this complex 
difficulty and to re-set the approach to virus suppression on the basis of real time data and 
controls that are in multiple vulnerable points for transmission.   These Figures are suitable 
for addition of further layers of analysis to expand the process as information is gathered 
and an intelligence fusion occurs using clinical, social, security and statistical information. 
 
The UK has apparently failed to lean lessons from its experience with the 2009 influenza 
pandemic, where the independent review observed - ”modellers are not ‘court astrologers’. 
Time spent at SAGE and the CCC to discuss modelling produced using emerging data may 
have been better spent on other issues” [74]. Perhaps if more time had been spent 
considering the handling of SARS-like infections by Asian countries, particularly South Korea 
whose population is comparable in size to the UK, more an earlier focus would have been 
placed on implementing a track, trace, test, quarantine approach thus limiting the spread in 
the community. 
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